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The Impact of the Fiscal Crisis on Greek and Portuguese Welfare States: 
Retrenchment before the Catch-up? 
 
Sotirios Zartaloudis 
Department of Politics, History and International Relations 
Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK 
 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the impact of the ongoing (2008–13) economic crisis on Greek and Portuguese 
welfare state reforms in a comparative perspective with a particular focus on the public sector, 
labour markets and social protection. It is argued that the recent crisis caused ‘shock and awe’ in 
Greece and Portugal resulting in an unprecedented wave of cuts, tax rises and labour market 
reforms. In particular, public sector remuneration and jobs were cut, pensions were significantly 
curtailed and pension rights significantly restricted, successive tax hikes were implemented and 
welfare benefits became less generous and more conditional.  It is argued that these reforms 
constitute a critical juncture and a considerable effort towards welfare retrenchment, which is 
implemented before converging with the more advanced welfare states of the EU15. Both countries 
appeared to be significantly more vulnerable to the crisis than the richer countries of Northern 
Europe (e.g. Germany, Austria, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands) and their larger Southern 
counterparts (Italy and Spain).  Yet, the latter had to implement similar measures, albeit in a less 
abrupt and extensive fashion. In other words, it may be that size is less important than economic 
and political power for coping with the effects of the current crisis. 
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Introduction 
The integration of Europe’s Southern Periphery (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain – known as the 
cohesion countries, or by the offensive acronym PIGS) into the EU has always been a controversial 
issue: on the one hand, some have highlighted the acute disparities between Europe’s periphery and 
core (cf. Rodriguez-Pose 2002). On the other hand, the literature emphasized the crucial link 
between EU membership and political, economic and social modernization (see Featherstone and 
Kazamias 2001). The recent financial crisis of 2007 and the subsequent sovereign debt crises in 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal put cohesion counties along with Italy at the centre of a borrowing cost 
upward spiral. Their ever-increasing borrowing costs and recourse to the EU and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial support meant that they had to implement extensive fiscal 
consolidation measures to tackle their unsustainable borrowing levels and costs. 
This article discusses the impact of the ongoing (2008–13) economic crisis on Greek and Portuguese 
welfare state reforms with a particular focus on the public sector, labour markets and social 
protection. The first part discusses briefly the  literature  on  the  characteristics of the  Greek and  
Portuguese welfare states, arguing that despite disagreements between different schools of 
thought, there is a broad consensus that both welfare states are underdeveloped and weak – 
especially in comparison to those of the other members of the EU15.1  The second part discusses the 
trajectories of the Greek and Portuguese welfare states until the financial crisis, arguing that despite 
consider- able improvement, both Greece and Portugal caught up only partially with, and with much 
less generous provisions than, the rest of the EU15. The third part examines the impact of the 
financial crisis on the Greek and Portuguese welfare states, arguing that both countries 
implemented very similar reforms – especially after Portugal received a bail-out in April 2011 from 
the European Commission/European Central Bank/International Monetary Fund (EC/ ECB/IMF), the 
so-called troika (that is, one year after the Greek one in May 2010): public sector remuneration and 
jobs were cut, pensions were significantly curtailed  and  pension rights significantly restricted, 
successive tax hikes were implemented and welfare benefits became less generous and more 
conditional. 
It is argued that these reforms constitute a considerable effort towards welfare retrenchment (cf. 
Pierson 2000; Hemerijck 2002) which is implemented before converging with the more advanced 
welfare states of the EU15 (for an overview of the weaknesses of the Greek and Portuguese welfare 
states vis-à-vis those of the EU15 along with a detailed analysis of their efforts to converge with their 
richer counterparts, see Katrougalos and Lazaridis 2003; Arts and Gelissen 2002; Rhodes 1997). Both 
countries appeared to be significantly more vulnerable to the crisis than the richer countries of 
Northern Europe (e.g. Germany, Austria, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands) and their larger 
Southern counterparts (Italy and Spain). Yet, the latter had to implement similar measures, albeit in 
a less abrupt and extensive fashion. In other words, it may be argued that it is not size but whether a 
country is part of the EU core or of the EU periphery in terms of economic and political power that 
matters for coping with the effects of the current crisis. 
  
Greek  and Portuguese Welfare  States:  The Poor Relative or a Distinct Model? 
Greece and Portugal have similar socio-political backgrounds and welfare systems with common 
features. The literature on the features of Southern European welfare systems follows mainly three 
distinct approaches. The first one  argues that  Southern  European  welfare states are  perceived as 
the underdeveloped/poor version of Esping-Andersen’s (1990)  Conservative or corporatist model 
(cf. Katrougalos and Lazaridis 2003: 16–30). In contrast, the second approach argues that they share 
a set of distinctive features, which lead to a unique type of welfare model. Despite the numerous 
differences between these two schools, both agree that Southern European countries form a distinct 
group. Yet they disagree on whether their similarities result in a variety of Esping-Andersen’s 
conservative type or a new model (for a detailed discussion of these schools’ main propositions, see 
Arts and Gelissen 2002: 141–6). Lastly, the third approach understands Southern Europe as welfare 
societies, where social protection is provided by the family and social networks rather than the state 
(cf. Santos 1994; Marinakou 1998). Despite their differences, all these schools of thought agree on 
the weakness of the Southern European welfare states, which results in low employment rates, high 
poverty, high inequality, a strong division between labour market insiders and outsiders, limited 
redistribution and inefficient welfare spending (cf. Sapir 2006). Unavoidably, this leads to poor 
provision of effective services and low satisfaction from the ‘customers’ of the public sector: Greece 
and Portugal usually achieve the lowest scores in bureaucratic efficiency among the EU15 
(Sotiropoulos 2004a; Van de Walle et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, while neither country was classified by Hall and Soskice (2001: 21) in their original 
typology of Varieties of Capitalism (VoC), Greece and Portugal were later classified as two cases of a 
third VoC type called Mixed Market Economies (MMEs) (Molina and Rhodes 2007). The main 
characteristics of MMEs are (Kornelakis 2011: 55–6):  considerable institutional stability combined 
with low institutional complementarities and clustering and mixed coordination that is both market 
and non-market. In MMEs the non-market element is provided mainly by the family given the 
absence of state intervention and the under-developed and inefficient welfare state (Molina and 
Rhodes 2007).  Moreover, both Greece and Portugal can be considered as two countries, where 
institutional change is unlikely (Hall and Thelen 2009). 
Nevertheless, EU entry in the 1980s constituted a turning point for both countries in terms of 
financial, cognitive and strategic resources (cf. Sotiropoulos 2004b, 2011; Zartaloudis 2011a). More 
specifically, both countries benefited considerably from EU structural funds (especially from the 
cohesion fund and the European Social Fund) that were vital to the financing of public services, 
public works and vocational training (cf. Sotiropoulos 2011; Zartaloudis 2011a). In addition, both 
countries developed a number of EU-inspired social policies, such as activation through Public 
Employment Services (Zartaloudis 2013a), gender equality policies (Zartaloudis 2011b) and in the 
case of Portugal a minimum income scheme (Zartaloudis 2011a). More- over, in  both  countries pro-
reform  governments and  actors (e.g. central bankers) used the Maastricht criteria for access to the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to help with the management of public finances and the 
promotion  of unpopular  reforms – especially labour  market and  pension reforms – throughout the 
1990s and 2000s. This is despite Europeanization being considered as weak (cf. Featherstone 2003, 
2005; Carrera et al. 2010; Blavoukos and Pagoulatos 2008). Furthermore, for both countries Europe 
has always been synonymous with higher living standards, a stronger welfare state and an economic 
policy which enhances social solidarity (cf. Sotiropoulos 2011; Zartaloudis  2011a). Although this 
emphasis on Social Europe was common in other southern European countries like Spain and Italy, it 
is not found in other member states such as the Central  and Eastern European Countries (where EU 
membership is not linked with social Europe but with human rights and protection from Russia), 
Scandinavian countries (where the EU is either neglected as irrelevant due to its weak social policy 
or feared as a threat  due to the single market and the EMU) or some continental old members such 
as France (where domestic actors boast that there is no EU influence since their welfare state is the 
model for the EU and not vice-versa) (cf. the respective chapters of Graziano et al. 2011 on the 
usages of Europe on domestic employment friendly reforms). 
 
Greek  and Portuguese Welfare  States  before the Crisis: Towards Catch-up? 
Besides the stabilization of their political systems (cf. Ioakimides  2001; Maravall 1997; Magone 
2003), for both countries EU entry meant a path towards catching up with their developed EU 
partners of the core (cf. Guillen et al. 2003; Sakellaropoulos 2007). Although Europe has always been 
used by domestic actors for upgrading national welfare states (cf. Sotiropoulos 2004b, 2011; 
Zartaloudis 2011a, 2011b, 2013a), this process remained incomplete and somewhat uneven. In  
other  words, despite considerable improvements in their welfare states, both Greece and Portugal 
caught up only partially with, and with much less generous provisions than, most EU15 countries. 
Hence, recent EU discourses blaming profligate southerners who have been living beyond their 
means (cf. Papadimitriou and Zartaloudis 2014 forthcoming) is only partially supported by empirical 
reality. 
 
Greece 
After the  restoration  of democracy in 1974, Greece  maintained  its long- standing model of statism 
– state intervention in economic and social activities – accompanied by clientelism, which 
marginalized any autonomous political expression of disadvantaged classes or groups 
(Diamandouros 1983). More- over, trade unions were subordinate to political party and the pressure 
from civil society, the  social partners  and  other  societal actors for progressive redistribution was 
weak (Petmesidou  1991). Nonetheless, until the Greek dic- tatorship (1967–74), Greece’s economic 
model was based on monetary and fiscal stability (Pagoulatos 2003). After 1974, however, monetary 
and fiscal stability were largely ignored by the post-dictatorship governments (Pagoulatos 2005). 
Hence, from 17.6 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1970, public debt increased to 28.3 
per cent in 1981 and reached the level of 112 per cent in 1986 (Ioakimides 2001: 77).  Additionally, 
the  1980s were characterized by government intervention that resulted in minimum wages that 
were not always in line with changes in productivity or levels of employ- ment, but rather with the 
political promises and ideological convictions of the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (Greek 
acronym: PASOK) governments  
 
 
  
Public deficit as a percentage of GDP 
 
 1981 1988 1995 1997 1999 2000 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Greece −11 −12.8 : : : −3.7 −6.5 −15.8 −10.6 −9.5 −10.0 
Portugal −9.2 −6.1 −5.0 −3.4 −2.7 −2.9 −2.8 −10.1 −9.8 −5.6
 −2.9 
EU27 : : : −2.7 −1.0 +0.6 −0.9 −6.9 −6.6 −4.4 −4.0 
EU17 : : −7.2 −2.8 −1.5 −0.1 −0.7 −6.4 −6.2 −4.2 −3.7 
 
Source: 1981 and 1988 data from Eurostat; Dornbusch and Draghi 1990: 2. 
 
(Venieris 2006). This policy, however, had a negative effect on unemploy- ment,  which became an  
acute problem especially among the young and women (Katrougalos and Lazaridis 2003: 59) as the 
country’s competitiveness declined considerably (Venieris 2006). 
After the early 1990s, both PASOK and New Democracy (ND) govern- ments implemented a number 
of privatizations and labour market reforms in order to achieve EMU  entry by the late 1990s (cf. 
Pagoulatos 2005: 360), which trade unions opposed (cf. Featherstone 2003). Moreover, pay rises 
and generous pensions along with early retirement schemes continued unabated (Tsakalotos 1998: 
121). Additionally, Greece had been traditionally plagued by low tax revenues, which had been 
consistently lower than the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) average (Meghir et al. 2010: 10–13).  The  latter is not only related to public sector 
inefficiency and corruption, but also to the structure of the economy, as the country’s unofficial 
sector is larger than the EU average and self-employment and/or family businesses are  more  
common  than  in the  rest of the  EU (Katrougalos and Lazaridis 2003). Despite media coverage of 
public sector profligacy  (cf. Featherstone 2011; Verney 2009), clientelism did not lead to an 
overstaffed public sector, but one plagued by persistently low efficiency despite gradual 
improvement during the period 1990–2000 (Afonso et al. 2005). 
Moreover, Greece was one of few EU countries providing pay rises to public (and private) sector 
employees until 2008 (cf. Kapsalis 2011). Despite some very minor pension reforms (cf. Featherstone 
and Papadimitriou 2008), Greece continued to provide generous pensions to public sector 
employees along with various formulas for early retirement (Tsakalotos 1998: 121). Con- sequently, 
public sector personnel outlays (including pensions), despite a temporary slowdown in the mid-
1990s, constitute the principal expenditure item in the budget (Papapetrou 2006: 451; OECD 2002). 
Additionally, although Greece faced a number of Excessive Deficit Procedures, high growth rates and 
the notorious ‘Greek statistics’, which systematically under-reported  Greek debt and deficits,2 
allowed Greek governments to avoid electorally painful reforms that required the reduction of 
public expenditure (see tables 1 and 2). 
As a result of the policies discussed above, Greece was plagued with persistently high public debt, 
deficits and sluggish growth during the 1980s (see 
 
Table 2 
 
Public debt as a percentage of GDP 
 
 1981 1988 1995 2000 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Greece 28.8 73.6 97.0 103.4 107.4 129.3 148.3 170.3 156.9 
Portugal 37.1 72.2 59.2 48.5 68.3 83.7 94.0 108.3 123.6 
EU27 : : : 61.9 59.0 74.6 80.0 82.5 85.3 
EU17 : : : 69.2 66.4 80.0 85.4 87.3 90.6 
 
Source: 1981 and 1988 data from Eurostat; Dornbusch and Draghi 1990: 2. 
 
 
Table 3 
 
GDP per PPS compared to the EU27 average 
 
 
1996         2000         2004         2008         2009         2010         2011        2012 
 
Greece 83 84p 94p 92p 94p 87p 79p 79p 
Portugal 77 80 85 83 84 82 82 81 
EU17 115 115 113 109 108 108 108 108 
 
Source:  Eurostat. 
Note:  p = provisional value. 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Unemployment levels 
 
 1995 2000 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Greece : 11.2 8.3 9.5 12.0 17.9 24.5 
Portugal 7.2 4.51 8.9 10.6 11.4 13.42 16.4 
EU27 : 8.8 7.2 9.0 9.7 9.7 10.6 
EU17 10.5 8.7 7.6 9.6 10.1 10.2 11.4 
 
Source:  Eurostat. 
Notes:  1 = estimated value; 2 = break in series. 
 
 
table 5). Nonetheless, when fiscal consolidation was coupled with privatization after the early 1990s 
in order to achieve EMU entry, growth picked up and until 2007 Greece enjoyed a period of 
increasing prosperity, with high growth rates, decreasing unemployment rates and rising incomes 
(tables 3 and 4), which led to a 94 per cent of EU27 average GDP per capita in Purchasing Power 
Standards (PPS) (see table 3).  
 
Growth levels 
 
 1996 2000 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Greece 2.4p 3.5p 3.0p −3.1p −4.9p −7.1p −6.4p 
Portugal3.4 3.9 2.4 −2.9 1.9 −1.6 −3.2 
EU27 1.8 3.9 3.2 −4.5 2.1 1.6 −0.4 
EU17 : 3.8 3.0 −4.4 2.0 1.5 −0.6 
 
Source:  Eurostat. 
Note:  p = provisional value. 
 
 
Portugal 
Portugal witnessed a similar trend towards welfare expansion after the restoration of its democracy. 
By March  1975 military and  civilian leftists were power and a ‘revolutionary’ period followed with 
the nationalization of major sectors of the economy (including banking, insurance, shipbuilding, air 
and road  transport,  cement and  beer production) and  the ‘occupation’ of the majority of the large 
farms in the south by their workforce. Although the 1976 elections marked the beginning of a new 
era of parliamentary democracy, political instability continued until 1986 when Portugal joined the 
European Community, as from 1975 to 1987 there were frequent changes of government. 
Unsurprisingly, public policy was very unstable until 1986, as governments tried to reconcile the 
conflicting objectives of social justice and fiscal stability. After the 1987 elections, coalition 
governments were replaced by a series of single-party majority governments (Social Democratic 
Party [Portuguese acronym: PSD]3 governments during 1987–95 and Socialist Party [Portuguese 
acronym: PS] governments during 1995–2002). The 1987–95 PSD governments – led by Prime 
Minister (PM) Cavaco Silva – initiated numerous generally successful and popular reforms aimed at 
encouraging private enter- prise and improving public finances, with the help of generous EU 
funding. For instance, privatizations only became possible after the 1989 constitutional reform. EU 
accession and the prospect of the completion of the single market were key factors in promoting 
these changes (Hemerijck et al. 2002: 76). As a result of these pro-business measures, foreign 
investment grew enormously, contributing greatly to economic growth and higher employment. 
With the exception of a short break in 1992, Portugal witnessed steady economic expansion from 
1993 to 2000 (OECD 2001: 10). 
After the 1995 elections, PM Guterres headed fairly stable PS governments, which followed policies 
very similar to those of the PSD governments. For instance, in February 1996 Portugal approved a 
new privatisation4 programme for 1996–97, in which 22 companies were partly or completely 
privatised (EIU 1996:  13). Despite the PS governments’ greater emphasis on social issues – especially 
on increasing social spending and on educational reform – economic policy throughout the 1990s 
was largely shaped by the need to meet the Maastricht criteria (Hemerijck 2002). This bi-party 
consen- sus on the objective of early EMU entry facilitated the governments’ efforts. While other EU 
member states’ governments faced strong opposition to the austerity programmes that were 
intended to meet the criteria for EMU accession, protests remained fairly subdued in Portugal.   
Nonetheless, during 1995–2001 public spending grew on average by 8 per cent every year as 
thousands  of new jobs were created  in  the  public sector, a  Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI) 
scheme was introduced and  hundreds  of wider public sector bodies were created (EIU 2002: 19–
20). Due to its narrow victory in the 2002 elections, the PSD formed a coalition government with the 
small Popular Party, a right-of-centre libertarian/conservative party. Although Portugal experienced 
its steepest economic recession in two decades during 2002–04, the PSD-PP government 
implemented a severely restrictive budgetary policy. Poor economic growth and relatively high 
unemployment rates continued throughout the 2000s. PM Sócrates’ PS government of 2005–12 
implemented a number of cuts and reforms in order to place the country’s deficit under control and 
stimulate growth. However, Portugal did not escape the fate of Greece and requested a bail-out 
from the troika in April 2011, that is, one year after Greece did so in May 2010. 
 
Welfare  State  Policy  in an Era of Crisis: Abrupt Retrenchment 
Greece and Portugal exhibited divergent reform records before the crisis. While Greece maintained 
a generous expansionary policy until 2008, Portugal implemented a number of cost-containment 
reforms. However, both countries have implemented very similar welfare reforms since the 
beginning of the crisis aiming to reduce public spending through a combination of cuts, tax rises and 
internal devaluation. In other words, both Greece and Portugal had to implement welfare 
retrenchment before catching up with the more advanced welfare states of the EU15. 
 
Greece 
Until 2008, Greece was providing generous pay rises in both the public and the private sector. It was 
only in March 2009 that the outgoing ND government implemented a pay freeze for public sector 
employees and pensioners with some concessions for those on low salaries and pensions that  were 
intended to mute the reaction of the trade unions. Thus freezes were applied only to public sector 
(excluding state-owned corporations) employees earning more than €1,700 (gross) and pensioners 
receiving more than €1,100 (Tikos 2009). In an attempt to allay the opposition’s concerns, the ND 
government provided some financial compensation (a tax free allowance of €500) for those earning 
up to €1,500 (gross) and receiving a monthly pension of up to €800. For those earning between 
€1,501 and €1,700 the allowance was €300 (Tikos 2009). Trade unions reacted angrily to the 
government’s measures and held a mass strike in April 2009. Nonetheless, the government went 
ahead  and implemented the cuts. These were the last measures aiming to cut public spending until 
2010 when Greece requested official support from the troika. 
PASOK could not implement any fiscal consolidation measures and/or cuts when it took office, as 
this would have sharply contradicted its electoral manifesto. On the contrary, it even gave an 
extraordinary social solidarity benefit to two and a half million low income citizens in 2009 worth €1 
billion (Kousta 2009; Express 2009).  The dramatic  revision of the  Greek public finance statistics and 
the subsequent reform inertia of the Greek government – coupled with Greek and EU officials’ 
public statements about Greece’s dire financial situation – led to increasing uncertainty about 
Greece’s membership of the EMU. Reform inertia came to an abrupt end on 15 March 2010 when, in 
a highly atypical fashion for post-authoritarian Greek politics, the PM announced significant cuts for 
public sector employees and (public and private sector) pensioners. According to PM George 
Papandreou,  ‘Europe’ demanded  these measures in  exchange  for its financial support  through 
Eurozone  and   IMF  loans  (see  Zartaloudis  2013b; Papadimitriou   and Zartaloudis 2014 
forthcoming). 
The troika-Greece deals and the subsequent Memoranda of Understand- ing (MoUs) entailed the 
promotion of three main goals: 
1.    to eliminate fiscal imbalances by achieving fiscal surpluses; 
2.   to improve competitiveness; 
3.   to provide liquidity for Greece until its return to the financial markets. 
Given  the  country’s large  fiscal imbalances when  it  requested  official support (see tables 2 and 3 
above), the MoUs initially focused on achieving fiscal consolidation by cutting public sector spending 
and increasing tax revenues. Greece implemented several rounds of public spending cuts including 
(cf. Commission of the European Communities 2010b, 2012): the reduction of public investment, a  
gradual  abolishment of the  so-called 13th and  14th salaries (Christmas, Easter and summer 
bonuses) for public sector workers, the establishment of a uniform system of public sector 
remuneration, the introduction of a pay ceiling for general government employees (starting from 
approximately €3,000 per month in 2010 and currently set at €1,900), the reduction of allowances 
by approximately 30 per cent, the introduction of a one per five hiring ratio in the public sector – 
meaning that only one employee could be hired only for every five who left – and the introduction of 
a labour reserve scheme whereby approximately 150,000 public sector workers would be fired or 
forced into early retirement. In November 2012, the newly elected coalition government 
implemented the latest austerity measures which included inter  alia: the  halving of all 
remuneration  of local government officials, the further reduction of allowances for all public sector 
employees, the reduction of pay for all high-level bureaucrats and political personnel, the inclusion 
of more employees of the wider public sector in the common remuneration system and the further 
reduction of public sector employees paid via special arrangements (e.g. the judiciary and the army). 
In addition, a series of pension cuts were implemented for all (public and private) pensioners: the 
13th and 14th pensions were gradually abolished for pensioners earning over €2,500 monthly and 
those below 60 years of age, all pension entitlements were frozen until 2014, pensioners earning 
more than €1,400  would pay an additional tax (constituting between 3 per cent to 9 per cent of 
their remuneration), the retirement age was increased to 67 years of age for all employees, many 
occupational funds providing more favourable  conditions  were  merged  with  the  main  social 
security fund of the private sector – thus transforming the Bismarkian Greek pension system to a 
multi-pillar pension system with separate contributory and non- contributory  elements  (Matsaganis 
2011).  Moreover,  in  November  2012 most pensioners lost a great amount (25 per cent to 50 per 
cent on average) of the lump sum payment they received when they retired, and a regress- ive 
reduction  of pension remuneration  was implemented (5  per  cent cut for pensions from €1,000  to 
€1,500  up to 25 per cent for pensions above €4,000). 
The above cuts were combined with a series of tax rises. More specifically, in the first year of the 
MoU a number of indirect taxes were introduced along with the steep rise in Value Added Tax (VAT). 
Additionally, Greece gradually harmonized its ceiling for taxable income with the EU average as it 
had the most generous scheme (€12,000) in the OECD (Garello 2012). Moreover, all Greeks earning 
above a certain income had to pay an extra tax called Social Solidarity Tax, which would finance a 
cash benefit for the poorest Greeks. Furthermore, all home owners had to pay an additional 
property tax. Another key aspect of all MoUs was the reform of the tax collection system through a 
reduction of the number of agencies responsible for tax collection, the reduction of staff numbers 
and bureaucratic processes along with the modernization of the tax collection system. The latter 
aspect still remains to be seen in Greece and has proven to be the most difficult to implement (cf. 
Commission of the European Communities 2010b, 2012). 
With regard to increasing competitiveness, Greece had to reduce its labour costs as it had previously 
given frequent pay rises above productivity since the early 1980s. For this purpose, Greek 
governments introduced a series of pay freezes in the private sector as well as a new framework of 
lower minimum salaries and lower pay levels than the national minimum for young workers. 
Furthermore, a series of labour market reforms were implemented aiming to promote flexibility of 
employment relations by allowing collective agreements at the local, sectoral and company levels 
even if their provisions are less favourable than those of the national-level agreements. A major 
change was also introduced in the setting of the national minimum wage through the latest austerity 
package (Law 4093/12 of November 2012) whereby the minimum wage will not be determined 
through collective bargaining between social partners but through governmental decrees after 
consultation with the social partners (cf. Lampousaki 2013).  
Another key element of the MoUs was a requirement linked with a number of EU directives 
regarding the opening up of the so-called closed professions, as in Greece most professions (e.g. 
lawyers, pharmacists, taxi drivers and engineers) were heavily regulated with restrictions on entry, 
operation and service fees. Greece also had to implement a series of privatizations. However, little 
progress has been observed on this front thus far while the prospect of a mass privatization  
programme  has  attracted  fierce resistance from trade unions and opposition parties (cf. 
Zartaloudis 2013b). 
 
Portugal 
Contrary to Greece, Portugal embarked on welfare retrenchment in the early 2000s. More 
specifically, after 2002, PM Barroso’s centre-right government implemented numerous cost-cutting 
measures: it closed 30 public organizations, froze the hiring of permanent public sector employees, 
froze pay rises for salaries above €1,000, announced that no temporary employment contracts in the 
public sector would be renewed (a measure that resulted in up to 50,000 redundancies), 
implemented a reorganization of existing public sector staff by allowing the horizontal 
interdepartmental  transfer of employees and introduced – but failed to actually implement – an 
entirely new system of promotions based on individual performance evaluations (known as 
Integrated System of Performance Evaluation/SIADAP) (Stoleroff 2007; Lima 2008). 
During 2005–09, the PS government enacted a series of harsh austerity measures, including tax 
increases and wide-ranging public administration reforms. The government targeted especially 
public-sector employees in order to meet its medium term stability programme projections of a 
gradual decrease of the general government deficit from 4.6 per cent of GDP in 2006 to 3.7 per cent 
in 2007 and 3 per cent in 2008. In a dramatic U-turn from its electoral promises of fiscal expansion, 
the PS government maintained the salary freeze for those earning more than €1,000 and also 
implemented a freeze on promotions and career advancement, raised fees and related charges for 
public services and increased the retirement age along with reducing pensions for public sector 
employees (EIU 2006: 6–7; Stoleroff 2007). Moreover, the PS government fully implemented the 
SIADAP system for public sector employees and  closed 187 ‘overlapping’ public entities (Lima and 
Naumann  2006). In 2008, the PS government was reported to have maintained the goal of making 
redundant around 75,000 public sector employees, even though  the share of public employment in 
the overall workforce in Portugal was below the EU average. The PS justified this by emphasizing the 
higher than the EU average public sector personnel costs (14.6 per cent of GDP in Portugal, over 12 
per cent at the EU) (Lima 2008). Lastly, the PS government transformed employment relationships 
for the employees in the police, the army and the judiciary by converting their contractual status 
into individual employment contracts. This meant that public sector employees could be easily 
transferred or fired due to poor performance and, hence, they were almost equated with private 
sector employees (Stoleroff 2007). 
Despite increasing uncertainty in global financial markets due to the financial crisis, which began in 
2006 when a number  of small financial firms providing high-risk sub-prime mortgages collapsed and 
peaked with the collapse of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008 (cf. Eichengreen et al. 
2012),  Portugal provided a 2.9 per cent pay rise for all public sector workers in 2009. This measure 
contradicted the PS government’s policy of wage moderation, which had been implemented since it 
took office in 2005. Although the government argued that the main reason for this U-turn was the 
country’s solid public finances, it appears  that  this one-off  pay  rise was related to the national, 
European and local elections of 2009. Tellingly, in 2010, despite the fierce opposition of the trade 
unions, the government imple- mented a pay freeze for public sector employees (maximum pay rise 
of 0.8 per cent in accordance with the inflation rate) (Lima 2010a).  
In addition, the government  imposed  stricter  financial penalties  for  early  retirement  by 
increasing the annual cut of 4.5 per cent for each year before the legal age of retirement to 6 per 
cent (Lima 2010a). These measures sparked a series of trade union strikes and protests which, 
nonetheless, did not deter the govern- ment from enforcing the reforms (Lima 2010b). The next 
wave of cuts was implemented in May 2010, which brought an end to the measures imple- mented  
one  year  earlier  by the  PS  government,  such as more  training and employment subsidies and 
extension of unemployment benefits to tackle the negative effects of the economic crisis (cf. Lima 
2009, 2010e). Despite the fact that they were ferociously opposed by the trade unions, these 
measures were co-decided with the leader of the PSD Passos Coelho (Lima 2010b, 2010d). 
In September 2010, the government introduced additional ‘emergency’ austerity measures as a 
result of continued market pressure and consecutive downgrades by major credit rating  agencies. 
The PS  minority government proposed the following measures for the 2011 state budget (Lima 
2010c): an overall 5 per cent  cut in core and  wider public sector remuneration expenses resulting 
from a 3.5 per cent to 10 per cent cut to salaries over €1,500 per month and a freeze on all 
promotions, lower spending on pensions, allowances and social benefits and a freeze on public 
sector investment. The proposals also included public sector restructuring, which could result in 
redundancies and  privatization of public corporations (cf. Lima 2011a). In  March  2011, in an  
attempt  to  avoid recourse to  external  financial assistance, the  PS  government  proposed  another  
austerity  package  (the fourth within a year) which included a series of cuts in welfare and health 
budgets along with a pension freeze. However, the Parliament rejected the bill and PM Sócrates was 
forced to resign. By May 2011, Portugal was following Greece  and  Ireland  on  the  deeply 
unpopular  path  of requesting financial assistance from the troika.  
In October  2011, the PSD-PP government introduced an additional austerity plan for the 2012 
budget, described by  PM  Coelho  as  ‘the  most  difficult to  close and  implement  in  living 
memory’ (Lima 2011b). The  plan included the suspension of the 13th and 14th salary bonuses for 
public sector employees and pensioners earning over €1,000  a month  for the duration  of 
Portugal’s bailout programme, while those earning between €485 and €1,000  a month would have 
one of their bonus salaries cut. According to some estimates, during 2010–11 public sector 
employees lost approximately 20 per cent of their income, with more losses for the high-paid staff 
(Lima 2011b). Beyond cuts in public sector remuneration, the budget included a series of extensive 
cuts in education, healthcare, social protection and public investment. It should be stressed that 
both measures (50  per cent cut on Christmas bonus for 2011 and the suspension of the  Christmas 
and  holiday bonuses afterwards) went beyond the  troika’s requests, as the government promised 
during its electoral campaign that it would go much further than the MoU required it to (Lima 
2011b). According to PM Coelho these measures were necessary because Portugal had to imple- 
ment additional measures worth €3 billion to meet its budget deficit reduc- tion goal for 2011. 
The next wave of cuts was introduced by the 2013 budget which was passed on 27 November 2012. 
The latter abolished the holiday bonus of an extra salary for public sector employees while public 
sector pensioners were to receive only 10 per cent of it. In addition, 50,000 public sector jobs were 
to be cut (Lima 2013a). However, after the Constitutional Court rejected key cuts on grounds of 
fairness,5 the government increased the working hours of public servants from 35 to 40 on grounds 
of fairness, proposed the merging of their various supplementary bonuses into a single system, 
increased their health- care contributions by one per cent and reduced their annual leave from 25 to 
22 days (Lima 2013b). In addition, it introduced stricter penalties for early retirees and  cut the 
budgets of the Ministries of Education and  of Social Security by €325 million and €299 million 
respectively. 
As was the case in Greece, the above cuts were combined with a series of tax rises. In September 
2010, the PS government increased VAT from 21 to 23 per cent. On 14 July 2011, barely a month 
after its election, a new PSD-PP government proposed an extraordinary tax of 50 per cent on any 
amount over the obligatory minimum wage of €485 in the Christmas bonus for all employees, 
pensioners and the self-employed. While employees and pensioners would have their bonus cut, the 
self-employed would have to pay an extra tax levy for the year 2011 (Lima 2011c). The next 
significant tax rise was included in the 2013 budget  which was passed on 27 November  2012 and  
redefined the personal income tax rate bands and introduced an extra 3.5 per cent levy on all 
categories for the year 2013. These measures increased direct income taxation by 30 per cent on 
average. The  most severely affected were the low-income earners who saw taxation of their 
earnings almost double as they were included in a new higher tax band (Lima 2013a). Moreover, the 
budget abolished numerous personal tax exemptions and introduced an additional ‘extraordinary 
solidarity tax’ of 3.5 per cent to 10 per cent on pensions above €1,350 a month (Lima 2013a). After 
the Constitutional Court rejected the latter measure (see also above), the government replaced it 
with a tax on all pensioners in order to ensure that the measure would not be judged uncon 
stitutional (Lima 2013b). 
As was the case in Greece, the MoU required Portugal to reduce its labour costs in order to boost its 
competitiveness. As a result, in November 2011 the PSD-PP government reached an agreement with 
the social partners to reduce severance pay for workers from 30 days to 20 days per year (Lima 
2012a, 2012b). Moreover, the government extended normal working hours for all employees by two 
hours per day in order to cut overtime costs. As was the case in Greece, Portugal pushed for more 
firm-level collective agreements and even individual agreements between employers and 
employees. In addition, it abolished four public holidays and extended the concepts of unsuitability 
and extinction of work positions to facilitate individual dismissals (Lima 2012b).  
 
Conclusion 
The recent financial crisis posed an immense challenge for Greek and Portuguese public finances. 
Both countries implemented a series of reforms aiming towards welfare retrenchment  (cf. Pierson 
2000; Hemerijck 2002):  public sector remuneration and jobs were cut, pensions were significantly 
curtailed and pension rights significantly restricted, successive tax hikes were implemented, welfare 
benefits became less generous and more conditional. Despite the better state of Portugal’s public 
finances, both countries have so far implemented similar cuts. Nevertheless, Greece had to 
implement these cuts much earlier than Portugal. In addition, both countries are also plagued with 
high unemployment, recession and a seemingly endless process of decreasing living standards. It 
can, therefore, be argued that Greece and Portugal have entered a period of welfare retrenchment  
before being able to converge in terms  of welfare provision with the  core  of EU15  (cf. Katrougalos  
and Lazaridis 2003). Tellingly, for both countries, EU and euro membership have been two 
celebrated achievements that were associated with an improvement in living and social standards 
and a Europeanization of their welfare states whereby the Greek and Portuguese people could enjoy 
similar social rights to the citizens of richer EU countries. Alas, both achievements are increasingly 
becoming associated with austerity – something unprecedented for both countries (cf. Sotiropoulos 
2011; Zartaloudis 2011a). 
Moreover, both countries appear to have been significantly more vulnerable to the crisis than the 
richer countries of Northern Europe (e.g. Germany, Austria, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands) 
and their larger Southern counterparts (Italy and Spain). Yet, the latter had to implement similar 
measures, albeit in a less abrupt and extensive fashion. In other words, it may be argued that it is 
not size but whether a country is part of the EU core or of the EU periphery in terms of economic 
and political power that matters for coping with the effects of the current crisis. The fact that three 
out of four cohesion countries have been ousted from financial markets and they have required 
EU/IMF support raises complicated and unsettling questions about the ability of the EU to achieve 
convergence between rich and poor countries and renders its future direction uncertain (cf. 
Krugman 2011). Additionally, it demonstrates the multi-faceted failure of markets, national 
governments, and EU institutions to anticipate and deal with the crisis (Tsoukalis 2011: 26–8; 
Papadimitriou and Zartaloudis 2014 forthcoming). It remains to be seen whether the (painful and 
unpopular) reforms discussed in this article will help in overcoming the crisis or whether Europe’s 
southern periphery will face more hardship in the future. 
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Notes 
1.  EU15 is the group of countries belonging to the EU before the 2004 enlargement – namely: 
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, the UK, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, 
Spain, Portugal, Austria, Sweden and Finland. 
2. After a long period in which Greece was under the Excessive Deficit Procedure for its public deficit, 
Eurostat  (Commission of the  European  Communities 2010a) published a damning report in which it 
stated that Greece remains the only country in the Eurozone that fails to provide the basic statistics 
necessary for the EMU, thus failing to meet the most fundamental – and at the same time basic – EU 
requirement for EMU. 
3. Contrary to its name and the political tradition in all European countries, PSD is a centre right 
party. 
4. Although privatization has also been driven by a broad political commitment to free enterprise 
and competition, EU-level liberalization measures have also been a key driver in this process (EIU 
2002: 23). 
5. The court argued that cutting the holiday bonus only for public sector employees was 
unconstitutional as the government targeted only one group of employees and not all Portuguese 
workers since the holiday bonus for private sector employees was not affected. The court also found 
the extension of the cut to pensioners unconstitutional and rejected the special levy on sickness 
allowance and unemployment benefit (Lima 2013b). 
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